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Resumo
Atualmente, os sistemas críticos estão cada vez mais presentes no nosso dia-a-dia, fazendo
aumentar a necessidade de os assegurar cada vez mais e reduzindo o risco de acidente ou
falha. A industria espacial e automóvel são exemplos de indústrias que usam esses sistemas
e que necessitam de os ver assegurados. Consequentemente, têm de ser tomadas medidas
para garantir a segurança de um sistema ao nível de software e hardware.
A injeção de falhas é uma das respostas a esse problema, fazendo uso das suas diferentes
técnicas para poder avaliar e validar sistemas críticos. A injeção de falhas pode ser consider-
ada uma técnica de teste ao software, onde as falhas podem ser injetadas ao nível do software
ou hardware e cujos resultados podem ser monitorizados de forma a avaliar como é que o
sistema reagiu a tais falhas. Scan-Chain Implemented Fault Injection é a técnica de injeção
de falhas que proporciona uma maior acessibilidade, observabilidade e controlabilidade. Com
esta técnica, os níveis de hardware e de integração de sistemas podem ser validados.
O csXception® é um ambiente de injeção de falhas automatizado desenvolvido pela Criti-
cal Software S.A para avaliar e validar sistemas críticos. A sua arquitetura é dinâmica e baseada
em plug-ins de injeção de falhas. Devido à crescente presença dos microcontroladores ARM®
Cortex-M3 na industria automóvel, surgiu a necessidade de criar um novo plug-in de injeção
de falhas para o csXception®.
Assim, o objectivo principal desta dissertação de mestrado é o desenvolvimento de um
novo plug-in de injeção de falhas para o csXception®, que permita injetar falhas em microcon-
troladores ARM® Cortex-M3, contextualizar o novo plug-in com a norma ISO-26262 e utilizar
um caso de estudo para mostrar alguns dos resultados obtidos.
v

Abstract
Nowadays, critical systems are much more present in our daily life, increasing the need
to ensure that these systems are becoming safer and thus reducing the risk of accident or
failure. The space and automotive industry are examples of industries who use these systems
and need to see them insured. Therefore, actions need to be taken to guarantee the safety of
a system, both at software and hardware levels.
Fault injection is one of the answers to that specific problem, making use of its different
techniques in order to respond to the critical system validation and evaluation. Fault injec-
tion can be considered as a testing technique, where faults are injected in the hardware or
software levels and whose results are monitored in order to evaluate how the system handles
such faults. Scan-Chain Implemented Fault Injection is a fault injection technique that provides
more reachability, observability and controllability. With this technique, the hardware-level and
system-integration validation can be guaranteed.
csXception® is an automated fault injection environment that validates and evaluates crit-
ical systems. Developed by Critical Software, S.A., the csXception®'s architecture is dynamic
and based on fault injection plug-ins. With the increasing presence of Cortex-M3 microcon-
trollers on the automotive industry, a new plug-in for csXception® needs to be developed.
Thus, the main goal of this master dissertation is the development of a new fault injection
plug-in for csXception® that allows the user to inject faults into ARM® Cortex-M3 microcon-
trollers, to contextualize the new plug-in with the ISO-26262 safety standards and to use a case
study to show some of the obtained results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Summary
This chapter briefly exposes the context of this thesis: it gives an overview of the project,
presents the company where the project was developed, and eventually shows the
structure of the document.
1.1 Overview
Nowadays, the software industry needs to increase the levels of reliance of computer sys-
tems. Aerospace, railway control, medical life-support, industrial plant control, nuclear power
plants, automotive industry and the defense sector are just some of the areas imposing new
challenges to software industries in terms of high availability, reliability and safety requirements.
Additionally, mission-critical systems may be increasingly found in our daily life in areas such as
the telecommunication industry, banking, insurance or any other industry that runs 24 hours
a day and 365 days a year and where computer malfunctions can lead to tremendous capital
losses.
In the last couple of years it became clear that the dependability requirements (Availability,
Reliability, Integrity, Security) of computer systems cannot be guaranteed with only careful de-
signs, quality assurances or fault avoidance techniques (Cotroneo, 2013). It is still unrealistic
to assume that faults can be completely avoided. Along these lines, the true challenge con-
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centrates on whether computer systems can provide the expected service in the presence of
faults. Software systems developed in the areas discussed before need, indeed, to be tolerant
to faults. This active area of research is known as Fault tolerance (Koren & Krishna, 2010).
To check whether a software system is either fault tolerant or not, the most straightforward
approach is to inject faults in the said system. These faults can be injected at both hardware
or software level. In an attempt to respond to market needs, Critical Software created csX-
ception®, a product that automatically injects faults into multiple processor architectures' and
software programming languages.
During my curricular internship at Critical Software S.A, it was my responsibility to
develop a new fault injection plug-in for ARM® Cortex-M3 microcontroller running on csXcep-
tion®. Even though the plug-in can run on any ARM® Cortex-M3 system its target area is the
automotive industry, injecting faults on an Anti-lock Braking System (ABS) demonstrator and
contextualizing the plug-in with the ISO-26262 automotive safety standard.
1.2 Critical Software S.A.
Critical Software (CSW) is a multinational Information Technology and Software company
founded by Gonçalo Quadros (Chairman), João Carreira and Diamantino Costa. In 2011, CSW
had a turnover of almost 20Me(twenty million euros). Today they have a Capability Maturity
Model Integration (CMMI) with a Level 5 quality certification.
Figure 1.1: Critical Software logo
CSW was established in the year of 1998 in Coimbra (Portugal) starting as a spin-off of the
University of Coimbra's business incubator and technology transfer center, the Instituto Pedro
2
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Nunes (IPN). Since then, CSW creates and deploys software solutions that guarantee support
for key operational functions by delivering software tools that protect personnel, monitor the
safety of equipment and ensures that critical processes are conducted securely and efficiently.
Currently, the CSW has offices in Coimbra, Lisbon and Oporto (Portugal), Chicago (USA),
Southampton (UK), São Paulo (Brazil), Maputo (Mozambique), Luanda (Angola) and Singapore
(Singapore).
1.3 csXception®
The csXception® is an automated Fault Injection (FI) environment that uses advanced
debugging and performance monitoring features existent on most modern processors to inject
faults using software and monitoring their impact on the target system. Being developed since
the mid-90s, it gave CSW the opportunity to work with the biggest aerospace agencies around
the world, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European
Space Agency (ESA), the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in order to validate their real time critical systems.
csXception® offers solutions for different target systems with a consistent user interface.
Moreover, it can always be improved by reducing the complexity of FI processes for different
fault models and target systems.
Figure 1.2: csXception® logo
1.4 Document Structure
• Chapter 2: Describes the state of the art on fault injection and safety-critical systems,
exploring the different techniques and tools used for this purpose;
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• Chapter 3: Contains the description, motivation and details about the fault injection
automotive plug-in;
• Chapter 4: Contains the development process implemented on the Cortex-M3 plug-in;
• Chapter 5: Presents the results obtained from the ABS case study;
• Chapter 6: Finalizes the document with some conclusions, the satisfaction on ac-
complishing the objectives and future work.
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Chapter 2
Safety-Critical Systems and Fault
Injection
Summary
This chapter provides information for understanding the theoretical theme of fault
injection, describing what is the motivation for its realization and which are its basic
principles, and enumerating the various techniques and tools developed in this domain.
Being developed by humans, all software products are, consequently, prone to errors.
As a result, programmers and hardware developers cannot predict everything and nothing is
neither absolutely certain nor controllable. As such, when working with critical systems we
must be aware of these variables because huge financial investments/impacts or human lives
can depend on those systems.
Fault injection evaluates and validates critical systems, helping in the development process
and giving additional information to the programmer by telling, for example, Where the bug
is, How it happened and What could happen after that. Applying fault injection techniques
to test critical systems will lead to a reduced failure probability.
In critical areas, such as Space Industry or Automotive Industry, the financial investment is
enormous and, consequently, their dependability on FI tools is increasing in order to guarantee
a higher resilience for the systems.
5
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2.1 Safety-Critical Systems
A system is considered as safety-critical when the consequences of its failure can lead to
the loss of a life or to significant property or environmental damage (Cotroneo, 2013).
Safety-Critical Systems (SCSs) are developed in several different domains and industries,
for example, in transportation, space, telecommunications, military infrastructures (e.g. nu-
clear and power plants) or medical control devices.
For each domain, SCSs are developed following a set of guidelines, specified on certifi-
cation standards whose typical aim is to give recommendations about all the development
process activities. For some safety-critical systems, these certifications are mandatory.
The software in such systems is much more complex. The need to perform more and more
tasks and to guarantee interaction between them and the hardware equipment is becoming
a real challenge. Even though the software is only one of the many parts of the SCSs, its
quality assurance is the most difficult one. Although the SCSs Software is usually developed
according with the most consolidate practices on software engineering, no methodology, tech-
nique or strategy is currently able to assure the absolute absence of software failures. At this
point, evaluation and validation of SCSs is crucial, guaranteeing that the SCSs Software and
Hardware are developed according to safety standards.
2.1.1 Space Industry
The Space Industry refers mainly to the manufacturing of components that go into the
Earth's orbit or beyond, such as satellites, launch vehicles and ground and mission control
systems. The hardware manufacturing and software development of these components are
carefully designed, documented and tested.
However, failures continue to happen. The most common in space is the single event
upset (SEU), which is a change of state caused by ions and electro-magnetic radiation striking a
sensitive node in a micro-electronic device, like in a microprocessor, a semiconductor memory,
or power transistors. In Section 2.3 a possible solution to test and simulate these kind of
6
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errors/failures will be presented.
Horror stories where millions of dollars were lost already happened in space industry. We
will present two of these stories next.
• In 1999, NASA lost communication with the Mars Climate Orbiter, sent to planet Mars
in 1998. NASA lost 125 million dollars because a Lockheed Martin engineering team
used English units of measurement while NASA's team used the more conventional
metric system for a key spacecraft operation. According to the NASA report: "...The
units' mismatch prevented navigation information from transferring between the Mars
Climate Orbiter spacecraft team at Lockheed Martin in Denver and the flight team at
NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California".
• In 2005, the DART Spacecraft incorrectly estimated the distance to the MUBLCOM
satellite, leading to a crash and the total loss of DART after it used all its fuel. Ac-
cording to the NASA report: "... a critical navigation failure occurred when the DART
and the MUBLCOM spacecrafts were about 200 meters apart, which precluded the full
activation of the AVGS (Advanced Video Guidance Sensor) and allowed DART to ap-
proach MUBLCOM without accurate ranging information. A later failure of the collision
avoidance system, which was relying upon inaccurate position and velocity information,
allowed DART to ultimately collide with MUBLCOM at a relative speed of approximately
1.5 meters per second. Both spacecrafts survived the collision without apparent dam-
age. Throughout the autonomous proximity operations, DART used its limited propellant
faster than anticipated, which caused a premature end to the mission".
This kind of event, which was precluded by software failures, is a perfect example of sce-
narios that can be strongly mitigated by the usage of fault injection techniques. Using FI and
an adequate FI model, the potential failure could probably be detected and mitigated during
development.
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2.1.2 Automotive Industry
Vehicles are part of our daily lives, whether we use them privately or in public transportation.
Despite the growing environmental concern, vehicles are continuously increasing in numbers
per capita in most countries. On average, the percentage of the cost of electronics embedded
nowadays in automobiles can account already for about 40% of the overall cost. This value
can be even higher in luxury models. Cars contain on average 30 to 50 Electronic Control
Unit (ECU) and today's average cars contain about 10 million lines of code. It is expected that
this number will grow up to 300 million in a decade (Economist, 2010).
As more Electrical and/or Electronic (E/E) components are used within safety critical func-
tions, safety has become a key issue for future automobile development. The most recent
progresses in the areas of driver assistance, vehicle dynamics control, and active and passive
safety systems increasingly touch the domain of safety engineering, as the failure of any of
these systems can lead to the injury or death of people. Future developments on these areas
will strengthen the need of safe system development processes, providing the possibility to
generate evidences that all the system components are working as they should with maximum
safety.
Situations where vehicles have to be recalled due to system or software issues have to be
avoided at all costs. I will present two examples to demonstrate these types of problems:
• In 2010, Toyota Motor Sales (USA) announced the recall of approximately 2.3 million
vehicles to correct sticking accelerator pedals on its 2009-10 RAV4, 2009-10 Corolla,
2009-10 Matrix, 2005-10 Avalon, 2007-10 Camry, 2010 Highlander, 2007-10 Tundra
and 2008-10 Sequoia models. This issue is being partly attributed to a software glitch
in the ECU control over the accelerator;
• In 2011, Honda issued a recall for 2.5 million CRV and Accord sedan due to a trans-
mission software glitch.
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2.1.2.1 ISO-26262 standard
Since safety is a crucial aspect for road vehicles, the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) prepared a new standard. ISO-26262, also entitled "Road Vehicles – Func-
tional Safety", is a functional safety standard that defines functional safety for automotive
equipment applicable throughout the lifecycle of all automotive electronic and electrical safety-
related systems, going from the system's conception to the system's maintenance. This stan-
dard is an adaptation of IEC-61508 (Figure 2.1) to comply with specific needs to the application
of E/E systems within road vehicles.
Figure 2.1: IEC-61508 decomposition
ISO-26262 defines stringent requirements in order to increase the dependability and qual-
ity of automotive safety critical systems. This is where fault-tolerant hardware and software
mechanisms (e.g. robustness, fault isolation, detection, recovery, containment, monitoring,
diagnostics, redundancy, etc.) are usually combined and used in order to guarantee (or at
least improve) the safety of the system. It is hardly possible to test all those mechanisms on
the system context without appropriate tools and without exercising all the operational con-
ditions and situations, including the extreme/limit cases. These cases arise usually when
hardware failures occur. When data is corrupted the software either falls into abnormal situa-
tions, or has defects that get triggered, or result in very uncommon situations (e.g. the Honda
CRV and Accord sedan recall). Fault injection techniques provide a way to cover and stimulate
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these extreme/limit or abnormal cases, depending on the realistic nature of the fault models
produced and the capabilities offered by the tools to inject the faults and monitor the injection
results.
With a trend of increasing complexity in software and hardware implementations, the inher-
ent risks also increase, such as systematic failures and random hardware failures. ISO-26262
provides a set of practical requirements and processes to minimize these risks. ISO-26262 is
only concerned with E/E systems, providing a framework within which safety-related systems
based on other technologies can be considered. Some of the most important characteristics
are:
• To provide an automotive safety lifecycle (management, development, production, op-
eration, service and decommissioning) and to support the tailoring of the necessary
activities during these lifecycle phases;
• To use Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL) to specify the item's necessary safety
requirements in order to achieve an acceptable residual risk;
• To provide requirements for validation and confirmation measures to ensure an accept-
able level of safety.
ISO 26262 is intended to be applied to safety-related systems that include one or more
E/E systems installed in passenger vehicles. Although until now only light passenger vehicles
are mandated to comply with the standard, it is foreseen that in a near future all vehicles,
including heavier ones, will also be mandated to abide with it.
One of the key concepts introduced by ISO-26262 is the ASIL. The hazard analyzis and risk
assessment procedures (executed during the safety life-cycle) are based on the combination
of the probability of exposure to the hazard, the possible controllability by the driver to the
exposure to the particular hazard, and the possible outcomes if a critical event occurs (Figure
2.2). This combination determines the ASIL of a particular system item.
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Figure 2.2: ASIL risk estimation
The ASIL does not address the technologies used in the system as it is, purely focusing
on the harm to the driver and other road users. Every safety requirement is assigned an ASIL
classification of the scale A, B, C or D, with D being the most safety-critical level.
2.2 Fault Injection
Fault injection evaluates the dependability of a system, studying generated errors and
failures. In complex systems it is hard to understand what causes some error/failures or
where they begin. It deals with the calculated insertion of artificial faults into a target system or
a simulation of it, in order to inderstand what could be the system's reaction to the injection of
real faults and providing a feedback for system correction or enhancement, or for operational
procedures' preparation (Hsueh, Tsai, & Iyer, 1997) (Carreira, Costa, & Silva, 1999).
FI has two main objectives:
• System validation: for testing the target system's fault-tolerance and verifying if it
gives the expected service. If it does not occur, a bug must be reported and fixed.
• System evaluation: to estimate the system's performance, providing information on
what kind of faults will occur and how frequently it will happen.
A system may not always behave as expected. The causes and consequences of these
deviations from the expected function of a system are called "factors to dependability" or
"fault-error-failure cycle" (Figure 2.3). (Ziade, Ayoubi, & Velazco, 2004) Each of these factors
are described below.
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• Fault is a defect in the system (it can also be called "bug") that may or may not cause
an error. For instance, although a system may contain a fault, the error is only triggered
depending on specific input data.
• Error represents the difference between the expected and actual result in a software
system. Errors are generated by a fault that changes the expected sequence of the
software system.
• Failure happens when the system's behavior is different from the expected. For exam-
ple, when an error occurs, if it is not caught and handled, the usage of fault tolerance
techniques causes an unexpected behavior on the system and can be considered a
failure.
Figure 2.3: System failure behaviour
When a fault causes an incorrect change in the target system an error occurs. Nevertheless,
the fault remains localized in the target system and other errors may occur from that one. When
a fault-tolerance mechanism detects an error it must handle the faults and hold the errors,
otherwise a system failure may occur.
2.2.1 Fault Injection History
The fault injection technique appeared for the first time in 1972 in an article by Harlan
Mills (Mills, 1972), describing a fault seeding approach (Voas & McGraw, 1998). The original
idea was to estimate reliability based on an estimate of the number of remaining faults in
a program. This estimation could be derived from counting the number of seeded faults that
were uncovered during testing, in addition to counting the number of real faults that were found
during testing.
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Initially applied to centralized systems especially dedicated to fault-tolerant computer ar-
chitectures' in the early 70's, fault injection was used almost exclusively by industries for mea-
suring the coverage and latency parameters of high reliable systems.
From the mid-80's, the academia started actively using fault injection to conduct experi-
mental research. The initial work was mainly concentrated on understanding the error propa-
gation and analyzing the efficiency of new fault-detection mechanisms.
In the early 90's, the foundation of fault injection was defined. More information and
research in the way of literature can be found, with descriptions on how to employ fault injec-
tion for hardware systems validation, software testing and hardware design validation (Benso
& Prinetto, 2003). It was only in the late 90's that the first fault injection tools for system
validation and evaluation made their appearances and one of them is the CSW's product:
csXception®.
2.2.2 Fault Injection environment
Figure 2.4: Basic components of a fault injection environment
In Figure 2.4 the basic components of a FI environment is represented. It usually includes
a Target System, Fault Injector, Workload generator, Monitor, Controller, Data collector and a
Data analyzer.
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• Target System is where the fault is going to be injected. It is typically running on a
separate computer.
• Fault Injector is what injects faults in the target system. The fault library (also called
fault model) is where FI techniques are specified, telling what is the fault type, location
and trigger in use.
• Workload generator is usually an application/program that runs in the target system
and contains its own libraries.
• Monitor receives the target system's outputs and communicates with the controller
that decides which data is going to be saved in the Data collector.
• Controller is the main component of the FI system, setting all the FI flow.
• Data collector saves the necessary data, generally in a database system.
• Data analyzer is the data processing analyzis, giving the user the necessary results
to find what can be wrong with his system.
2.2.3 Fault Injection and ISO-26262
The main purpose of ISO-26262 is to ensure the safety of road vehicles by providing a
set of guidelines to help product development. This functional safety standard divides the
product's development process in three main parts (Figure 2.5): system level integration (part
4), hardware development (part 5) and software development (part 6).
Figure 2.5: Decomposition of the product development phases
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The ISO-26262 is the first standard to present fault injection as a highly recommended
technique to be used at different critical levels. The purpose differs depending on the level
where it is applicable. Table 2.1 shows the ASIL levels for each test activity of the ISO-26262.
ISO-26262 test activities ASIL classification
System Level (Part 4)
Correctness of implementation of system design specifications
and technical safety requirements
B, C, D
Effectiveness of diagnostic coverage of hardware fault detection
mechanisms
C, D
Correctness of implementation of system design specifications,
technical and functional safety requirements
C, D
Effectiveness of diagnostic failure coverage of safety
mechanisms at item level
C,D
Correctness of implementation of functional safety requirements A, B, C, D
Effectiveness and failure coverage of safety mechanisms at
vehicle level
C, D
Hardware Level (Part 5)
Hardware integration tests to verify completeness and
correctness of the safety mechanisms' implementation
respecting hardware safety requirements
C, D
Software Level (Part 6)
Software unit testing D
Software integration testing C, D
Table 2.1: Fault Injection mapping on ISO-26262 test activities
Based on this document we may conclude that fault injection is recommended for all the
ISO-26262 test activities, namely for those with higher levels of criticality (C and D).
Even though ISO-26262 explicitly mentions the use of fault related approaches, the stan-
dard does not detail the recommended fault injection approach to be used. This leaves room
for various interpretations on how to approach this problem. Moreover, a correct fault model
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needs to be devised so that accurate fault injection can be performed.
2.3 Fault injection techniques
A fault injection application can act on different means, depending on what to validate
and/or evaluate. The most common techniques are described next.
2.3.1 Hardware Implemented Fault Injection
Hardware Implemented Fault Injection (HWIFI) uses additional hardware to inject faults on
a target system and examine the effects. Depending on the faults and their locations, HWIFI
falls into two categories, HWIFI with contact or without contact (Hsueh et al., 1997).
2.3.1.1 Fault Injection with contact
Occurs when the injector has direct physical contact with the target system, producing
voltage to the target chip. It is usually called pin-level injection because it interacts directly with
the circuit pins of the processor. The two main techniques of pin-level FI are:
• Active probes, which add electric current to the target processor via probes presented
on processor pins. However, we must be careful when using this technique because
excessive amount of voltage on the board can damage it.
• Socket insertion, which makes the simulation of various physical faults possible by
inserting a socket between the target hardware and its circuit board. The socket insertion
injects stuck-at, open or more complex logic faults, giving total control to the processor's
pin signals.
2.3.1.2 Fault Injection without contact
The injector has no direct physical contact with the target system, relying on an external
source that produces a natural physical phenomenon (Hsueh et al., 1997), very similar to what
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happens to aerospace devices. Heavy-ion radiation, electromagnetic interference, weather
conditions and temperatures are some of the examples of HWIFI without contact.
With heavy-ion radiation, an ion passes through the depletion region of the target device
and generates current.
However, it is hard to tell the exact time or location at which the fault is going to be injected,
since heavy-ion radiation and electromagnetic interference are not precisely triggered. (Cunha,
Barbosa, & Silva, 2013)
2.3.2 Software Implemented Fault Injection
Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI) is a low-cost and easy-to-control technique
to inject faults in a target system, compared to HWIFI techniques described before (Arlat et al.,
2003).
SWIFI is usually achieved by changing memory or registering values on the target system
based on a defined fault model. It can be categorized based on when faults are going to be
injected. There are two possibilities: during compile-time or during runtime.
2.3.2.1 Compile-Time Fault Injection
This method injects faults before the program's loading and execution. It injects faults
directly into the source-code or assembly-code by emulating the hardware effect. This method
implementation is very simple, but it does not allow the injection of faults as the workload
program runs.
2.3.2.2 Runtime Fault Injection
During runtime injection, a mechanism is needed so the fault is injected on the target
system. The most common ones are:
• Time-out - this is the simplest of all the techniques, as the trigger is obtained from
a software or hardware time-out. Since it injects faults based on time, it produces
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unpredictable reactions on program behavior.
• Exception/trap - in this case, when a hardware exception or a software trap occurs,
the workload control is passed on to the fault injector. A software trap is when a pre-
determinate instruction in the code is reached, injecting the fault before the selected
instruction. After that process the program resumes. Hardware exceptions can occur
when a particular memory location is reached. Both mechanisms must be linked to the
interrupt handler vector.
• Code Insertion - this mechanism inserts extra instructions, being the moment of
injection the execution of those instructions.
2.3.3 Scan-Chain Implemented Fault Injection
Techniques for injecting faults in physical systems, such as HWIFI or SWIFI, provide limited
controllability and observability. Moreover, these techniques may not be able to emulate the
effects of all fault injections because they suffer from a lack of physical reachability (Folkesson,
Svensson, & Karlsson, 1998).
One way of improving reachability as well as observability and controllability in the evalua-
tion of physical systems is to use Scan-Chain Implemented Fault Injection (SCIFI). Nowadays,
all processors implement the IEEE 1149.1 standard. This standard defines test logic which can
be included in an integrated circuit to provide standardized approaches to test the interconnec-
tions between integrated circuits once they have been assembled onto a printed circuit board.
The test logic consists of a boundary-scan register and other building blocks and is accessed
through a Test Access Port (TAP).
The SCIFI technique injects faults, taking advantage of these boundary-scan chains and
internal scan chains present in almost all mainstream developed processors.
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2.3.4 Robustness Fault Injection
Robustness fault injection is oriented to a particular programming language (C, Java, Ada,
etc.). The main objective of this technique is to analyze a given software Application Program-
ming Interface (API) for robustness weaknesses.
Typically, this API is a set of functions or routines that possesses a predefined set of pa-
rameters of specific data types. If API parameters are not validated when they are being called,
the use of these incorrect parameters may lead to erroneous system behavior or even system
hang or crash.
In order to assess such validation difficulties on API components, the methodology must
be based on the characteristics of the API parameter types and correspondent bounds. For
example, in a function composed by two parameters, each correspondingly integer and long
data types, the values to be injected will be bounded by the maximum and minimum data
values allowable by each data type.
2.4 Fault Injection Tools
Having presented fault injection techniques, we now present the different tools that imple-
ment such techniques. In this Section, the focus is on the analyzis of the said tools' architecture,
which use some of the techniques identified before.
2.4.1 csXception®
csXception® is a 100% JAVA application and may run in most operating systems, being
Linux, Windows and MAC OS just a few among the options. In addition, it also uses the
postgreSQL database system.
This product's architecture resembles to Client/Server type. The server side represents the
host computer and the client side is the target system where the faults are going to be injected
(Carreira, Madeira, & Silva, 1995) (Carreira, Madeira, & Silva, 1998).
On the host computer's side, the architecture is based on modules. The communication
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between these modules is made with Infobus, a Java communication class based on message
exchange. The architecture of csXception® is shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: csXception® architecture
csXception® is divided in four main modules:
• Experiment Management Environment (EME): front-end application that runs
in the host computer and is responsible for the workload, campaign, experiment and FI
definitions, execution and control. It provides a better user experience when interacting
with the csXception® tool (Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: EME (Screenshot)
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• Easy Fault Definition (EFD): allows EME to browse through the analyzed application
source code and inter-actively mark memory ranges to set fault triggers (Figures 2.8 and
2.9).
Figure 2.8: EFD source code trigger definition (Screenshot)
Figure 2.9: EFD assembly code trigger definition (Screenshot)
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• Xtract: executes predefined queries onto the csXception® database and presents
straightforward analyzis of FI experimental results (Figure 2.10).
Figure 2.10: Xtract (Screenshot)
• Injection Plug-In: defines the FI model. Changing this module will allow csXception®
to adapt to a different target architecture. Currently, there are several available plug-
ins with different FI techniques, particularly SCIFI, SWIFI and Robustness FI. Some
examples of injection plug-ins developed by CSW are:
– ERC32SCIFI: SCIFI plug-in that runs in ERC32 architecture target systems.
– LYNXPPC750: SWIFI plug-in that runs in PowerPC 750 architecture target sys-
tems.
– C-SW: Robustness FI for C language applications.
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2.4.2 GOOFI
Generic Object-Oriented Fault Injection (GOOFI) is a FI tool developed in JAVA and relies
on a Structured Query Language (SQL) database for storing data. The main goal of GOOFI is
to provide an easy way to adapt the new target systems or new FI techniques to the tool (very
much like csXception®).
With GOOFI, when a new FI technique is added, a new FI algorithm must be implemented
and the graphical user interface must be modified to support the new FI technique. (Aidemark,
Vinter, Folkesson, & Karlsson, 2001)
Figure 2.11: The GOOFI architecture
GOOFI consists of a three-layered architecture (see Figure 2.11):
• Top-layer: Graphical User Interface (GUI), where all menus to create and run FIs are
defined, giving a better user experience.
• Middle-layer: represents the tool Core, defining the FI model and the target system
interface definition.
• Lowest-layer: represents the FI data storage and the communication with the Middle-
layer and Top-Layer components.
The current version of GOOFI supports pre-runtime SWIFI and SCIFI techniques.
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2.4.3 RIFLE
RIFLE is a pin-level FI tool developed in C++ under the Windows operating system. This
tool can inject faults into a wide range of target systems and the faults are obviously mainly
injected in the processor pins.
Figure 2.12: The RIFLE architecture
RIFLE's architecture (Figure 2.12) is formed by four modules. Three of them are hardware
modules and the fourth one is for control and management, running only in the host computer:
• Adaptation module: is the hardware part which contains the target processor and
the FI's electronic switches elements.
• Main module: contains the fault trigger hardware and the trace memory. The fault
trigger activates a FI run when it reaches the expected conditions and the trace memory
continuously saves the information in the target bus.
• Interface and Counters Module: establishes the interface between the RIFLE host
and the other components.
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• Control and Management Software: is the Core module. Manages the experi-
ments' and fault's definitions, controls the FI sequence, validates fault definitions and
collects relevant FI results.
This tool can inject faults in different target systems, being only required that the users
change the adaptation module where the target architecture is defined (Madeira, Rela, Moreira,
& J.Silva, 1994). Although different from the other tools presented before, the fault model must
be the same, since its definition is centralized in the control and management software module.
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Chapter 3
Automated Fault Injection Plug-in
Summary
This chapter shows what are the plug-in development motivation, objectives and
requirements. Additionally, it gives an overview on all the high-level characteristics of the
plug-in development.
3.1 Objectives and Motivation
As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, the csXception® tool can be adapted to different target
architectures and techniques by implementing a fault injection plug-in which contains the fol-
lowing levels of operations/information:
• Fault definition – it is composed by the plug-in's fault model implementation and infor-
mation;
• Fault injection – it is responsible for all the fault injection process, namely the load and
run of the workload. It is also responsible for the installation of the trigger, the fault and
for collecting the debugger's output;
• Fault access – its main concern is the communication with the target system and the
collection of the outcome from the injection run, either from the Universal Serial Bus
(USB) or the Ethernet;
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Since Critical Software already developed other fault injection plug-ins there were some
reusable artifacts to create this plug-in, mainly for the GUI forms and for the fault definition
level.
On the fault definition level the target's architecture has to be defined and specified. In
order to do so, the target's system documentation (system datasheet) has to be analyzed so
all the memory location, where values can be read and written, can be accessed. However the
changes were but a few, since the existing fault definition models were considered applicable.
On the fault injection level the process has already been defined on other plug-ins (ex: run
workload > install trigger > wait for trigger > inject fault > etc.), but since this one's debuggers
are different from others used by other plug-ins and also has a different architecture, the com-
munication between the fault injection plug-in and the target system debugger has different
commands and instructions.
On the fault access level, the communication with the target system has to be fully de-
veloped because the old communication process (Serial COM java library) had some timeout
issues.
The target architecture of the automotive plug-in is based on Reduced Instruction Set Com-
puting (RISC) computer processors. This architecture provides higher performance because of
its simplicity, which enables a much faster execution of each instruction, and because the set
of instructions is smaller, making it less complex and propitious to errors. The target system
used in this new fault injection plug-in is the ARM® Cortex-M3 microcontroller. The application
of the Cortex-M family on automotive industry, particularly on systems with safety related func-
tions (airbag, anti-lock braking, etc.), is widely used. An example of this trend is the Toshiba
electrical vehicle motor control system, implemented by means of ARM® Cortex-M3 CPU cores
and compliant with the ISO-26262 standard. (Cunha et al., 2013)
The fault injection technique implemented in this plug-in is SCIFI because, as explained
in Section 2.3.3, it improves reachability and controllability, providing more accurate target
system validations, while also obtaining better target system evaluation regarding observability.
The plug-in's name is CortexM3scifi.
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3.2 Development Environment
The Cortex-M3 fault injection plug-in is based on a host-target environment and its aim
is to inject faults on a physical target system using a SCIFI technique. Figure 3.1 shows the
development environment of the Cortex-M3 plug-in on the Critical Software S.A office.
The target system (Cortex-M3 microcontroller and debugger) is on the left side of the figure,
inside an acrylic case and connected via USB (micro-USB and mini-USB) to a Dell Vostro
1015 computer running csXception® with CortexM3scifi plug-in and PostgreSQL in Windows
7 operating system.
Figure 3.1: Plug-in development environment
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3.3 Fault Model
A Fault Model is a realistic engineering model of erroneous events that may occur in the
construction, execution or operation of a system or system component. From this model,
the system designer or user can predict the consequences of a particular fault and act upon
it by making the system more robust. Typically, fault models are defined considering four
dimensions (Location, Duration, Trigger and Type), each one with its own characteristics.
• Location: is where the fault will be injected:
– Processor Register;
– Memory Address (Other processor register);
– Flash Memory.
• Duration: is for how long the fault will be injected. In this project the duration of faults
is one instruction cycle (e.g. the injection of an internal data bus fault during instruction
fetch affects the bus during one memory access to fetch the next instruction). However,
some faults may stay latent during several cycles (e.g. the fault injected on a general
purpose register stays latent until the affected value is used in some calculation or a
new value overwrites the same register);
• Trigger: is the dimension that defines when the Fault Injection will occur:
– Instruction Access Trigger - This fault trigger occurs when an instruction that was
fetched at a given memory address is at the pipeline execution stage;
– Memory Access Trigger - This fault trigger occurs when a memory address is
accessed;
– Timeout Trigger - This fault trigger occurs when a timeout reaches its end.
• Type: represents what the FI system will do when the time of injection comes, changing
the value on the locations defined earlier (e.g. processor register):
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– Bit Flip: is when one or more bits on the defined location are flipped;
– Reset Value: The value present in the fault location is overwritten with the reset
value of that register or memory address;
– Specific Value: The fault location value is overwritten with another value defined
by the user.
A basic fault model is presented in Table 3.1.
Location Duration Trigger Type
General Purpose Register #1 one clock cycle Instruction Execution Bit flip
General Purpose Register #11 one clock cycle Memory Access Bit flip
Program Status Register one clock cycle Instruction Execution Reset value
On-chip Flash one clock cycle Timeout Trigger Specific value
Table 3.1: Basic Fault Model
In the automotive industry, for a fault to have proper meaning a domain knowledge is re-
quired. This means that issues that occur at all levels of the product need to be known and
understood. From this point on, a more accurate fault model can be devised and implemented.
In the end, the failure modes can be mapped into the basic fault model and exercise/adul-
terate the correct parts of the system as well as evaluate the behavior. This will compose a
domain fault model (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: Failure Mode
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3.4 Requirements Catalogue
The following list of requirements was defined as the starting point for the development of
the Cortex-M3 plug-in. These requirements describe the functionality expected from the new
plug-in for the csXception® and the main constraints that the Cortex-M3 plug-in should follow.
REQ01 - Architecture compatibility with EME
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty High
The Cortex-M3 plug-in should be fully compatible with the software architecture of
EME v2.3.
Table 3.2: REQ01 - Architecture compatibility with EME
REQ02 - Architecture compatibility with EFD
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
The Cortex-M3 plug-in should be able to provide the option to use the Easy Fault
Definition (EFD) v1.0 module whenever the defined fault model needs it.
Table 3.3: REQ02 - Architecture compatibility with EFD
REQ03 - Architecture compatibility with Xtract
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
The data model of the Cortex-M3 plug-in should be compliant with the one defined
for the Xtract v1.0 module. Any extensions developed will be independent from
this module.
Table 3.4: REQ03 - Architecture compatibility with Xtract
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REQ04 - Plug-in Configuration
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
The Cortex-M3 plug-in should be able to provide the user a configuration panel
with board access information (COM port, bits per second, data bits, parity, stop
bits and flow control) and executable debuggers (Gnu DebuGger (GDB) and Open
On-Chip Debugger (OpenOCD)).
Table 3.5: REQ04 - Plug-in Configuration
REQ05 - Storage Information
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
For data storage, the Cortex-M3 plug-in should use the database management
functionalities provided by EME v2.3.
Table 3.6: REQ05 - Storage Information
REQ06 - Fault model definition
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty High
The Cortex-M3 plug-in must be compliant with the fault model detailed on section
3.3.
Table 3.7: REQ06 - Fault model definition
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REQ07 - Use of other software tools
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Low
The Cortex-M3 plug-in should avoid using software tools other than the ones used
by csXception v2.3 which are: Postgres database v9.2 and Java Runtime Environ-
ment v7.
Table 3.8: REQ07 - Use of other software tools
REQ08 - Use of third party Java libraries
Type Non-Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
The Cortex-M3 plug-in must only use third party libraries that are under the GNU
General Public License (GPL).
Table 3.9: REQ08 - Use of third party Java libraries
REQ09 - ABS case study
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority Medium Difficulty High
The Cortex-M3 plug-in must inject faults in a case study based on an ABS simulator
and analyze the results.
Table 3.10: REQ09 - ABS case study
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REQ10 - Multiple fault triggers
Type Functional
Status Proposed
Priority Low Difficulty Medium
The Cortex-M3 plug-in should be capable of implementing multiple triggers per
fault injection run. Example: After 5 seconds (timeout trigger), install an instruc-
tion trigger.
Table 3.11: REQ10 - Multiple fault triggers
REQ11 - Generate new campaign
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Low
The User should be able to generate campaigns.
Table 3.12: REQ11 - Generate new campaign
REQ12 - Generate new experiment
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty High
The User should be able to generate experiments.
Table 3.13: REQ12 - Generate new experiment
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REQ13 - Generate new workload
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty Medium
The User should be able to generate workloads.
Table 3.14: REQ13 - Generate new workload
REQ14 - Run fault injection
Type Functional
Status Mandatory
Priority High Difficulty High
The User should be able to run fault injection process.
Table 3.15: REQ14 - Run fault injection
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Automotive Plug-in Development
Summary
This chapter contains the details about the automotive plug-in development regarding the
architecture, the class diagram and the database design. It also describes all user
interactions/activities with the system.
4.1 Architecture
The csXception® is based on a Host/Target architecture (Figure 4.1) containing two differ-
ent devices.
A Windows or Linux operating system is running on the host device, with a PosgreSQL
database system and the csXception® execution environment that is responsible for four main
components: EFD, EME, Xtract and Fault Injection Plug-in (CortexM3scifi Plug-in). The csX-
ception® makes use of two debuggers (OpenOCD and GDB) to communicate with the target
system through USB.
The target system is composed by two devices: ICDI board and LM3S9B90. The ICDI
board is connected to the host device, allowing the user to control and access the Cortex-M3
microcontroller. The LM3S9B90 board contains the Cortex-M3 microcontroller and is also
connected to the host device to collect the output from the fault injection process.
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Figure 4.1: CortexM3scifi Architecture
Host Computer
The Host Computer runs a PostgreSQL database server that establishes communication
with csXception®. The csXception® comprises a front-end module which runs in a host com-
puter and is responsible for the experiment's management/control (EME), an instruction trigger
definition module (EFD), a data analyzis module (Xtract) and, finally, a fault injection plug-in
that is responsible for the fault injection process that runs in the system under evaluation/val-
idation, target output collector/monitor and the fault experiment definition.
The fault injection process uses a debugger execution environment with two components
connected to the ICDI board (target debugger) through mini-USB. GDB is a debugger that al-
lows intrusion on a software program while it is being executed (GNU, n.d.). But this is still
insufficient. Since the program is being executed on an external physical system and the fault
injection technique in use is SCIFI, an OpenOCD debugger is required to offer better control-
lability and communications with the target system, as well as a boundary-scan testing using
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JTAG adapter. (OpenOCD, n.d.)
In order to collect the output from the program's execution on the target system we must
use another component called Com_inC, with micro-USB connection. COM_inC establishes
communication between the Host and the LM3S9B90 (Cortex-M3 microcontroller) by a Se-
rial Communication (COM port) driver. The COM_inC component is a C developed executable
(.exe) whose initial connection was made in JAVA with the "SerialComm.jar" component. How-
ever, this library has known problems while disconnecting from the target system, causing a
long wait time for each fault injection run.
Target System
The Stellaris EKS-LM3S9B90 Evaluation Kit is a low-cost platform for the evaluation of the
LM3S9B90 board containing a Cortex-M3 microcontroller. The kit includes two boards: the
LM3S9B90 Board and the In-Circuit Debug Interface (ICDI) Board.
• EK-LM3S9B90: this board includes the ARM Cortex-M3 microcontroller, a 10/100
Mbit Ethernet port, a full speed USB 2.0 port and connectors for binding to the ICDI
board:
– JTAG/SWD: allows JTAG or SWD connections, mainly used to debug and preform
boundary-scan operations;
– PWR/UART: used to give 5V power and connect to the LM3S9B90 UART signals.
Figure 4.2: LM3S9B90 Evaluation board
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• ICDI: this board is a USB full speed JTAG/SWD debugger board that includes a mini-
USB connector so it can be rightly connected to an USB port.
Figure 4.3: ICDI board
4.2 User Interaction
In order to properly understand the functioning of the CortexM3scifi plug-in it is important
to represent the user interaction with the system.
Therefore, in Figure 4.4 the use-case diagram of the Cortex-M3 plug-in is represented with
five activities following a required order of events. Figure 4.5 shows the expected flow of events
in order to correctly use the tool.
Figure 4.4: CortexM3scifi Use-case diagram
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Figure 4.5: CortexM3scifi activity diagram
4.2.1 Generate new Campaign
A Campaign is a set of experiments that will run sequentially. The campaign generation is
a form with three fields (Figure 4.6):
• Title, Author and Description.
Figure 4.6: Generate new Campaign
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4.2.2 Generate new Workload
Workload is the binary file that will run on the target system when the fault injection process
starts. The workload generation is a form with four fields (Figure 4.6):
• Title and Author;
• Executable File - Binary file that was flashed into the board;
• Source Code Path - Path to the .C files, which are necessary to use the EFD module.
Figure 4.7: Generate new Workload
4.2.3 Configure CortexM3scifi plug-in
The Configuration panel is managed by the EME module, even though every fault injection
plug-in has a sub-section inside the "Targets" section.
The configuration window for the CortexM3scifi plug-in has two panels. First there is the
Debuggers panel, which holds the necessary binary files to establish connection with the ICDI
debugger board (Figure 4.3) and is divided in three fields:
• OpenOCD Location - Path to the binary file of the OpenOCD;
• OpenOCD Configuration File Location - Path to the OpenOCD configuration file;
• Debugger Location - Path to the GDB binary file;
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Figure 4.8: Configure CortexM3scifi - Debuggers Panel
Secondly there is the Target System Communication panel, which has all the necessary
configuration properties to establish connection with the Stellaris LM3S9B90 board (Figure
4.2). Its aim is to obtain the output from the Cortex-M3 microcontroller in the fault injection
process. The necessary fields are:
• COM Port - Port ID where the LM3S9B90 board is connected;
• COM Port properties - Bits per second, Data bits, Parity, Stop Bits;
Figure 4.9: Configure CortexM3scifi - Communication Panel
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4.2.4 Generate new Experiment
An Experiment is a sequence of fault injection runs separated by a target system reset and
executed in an automated manner. The generation of the experiment is the most extensive
process, being composed by 8 steps.
Step 1 - Basic information
In the first panel (Figure 4.10) the only mandatory field is the experiment title.
Figure 4.10: Generate Experiment - Basic information
Step 2 - Workload, Timeout and Gold-Run
The second panel (Figure 4.11) asks the user to select the workload used during the exper-
iment execution and the timeout values associated with the gold-run execution that include:
• Gold-Run Checkbox - an execution of the workload without injecting any fault. The aim
of the gold-run is to establish reference results;
• Timeout - chooses the workload timeout run based on the gold-run percentage time or
precise time value (seconds, milliseconds or minutes);
• Expected Output Checkbox - the expected output file produced by the Workload.
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At the top of the panel there is a table listing all the available workloads that have already
been defined. Note that at least one workload must exist in order to define a new experiment.
Figure 4.11: Generate Experiment - Workload, Timeout and Gold-Run
Step 3 - Injection Runs
In the third panel (Figure 4.12) the user can define the number of injection runs he wishes
to generate.
Figure 4.12: Generate Experiment - Injection Runs
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Step 4 - Fault Location
The fourth panel (Figure 4.13) presents the available target locations where faults can be
injected. These locations are separated by categories: Processor Registers, Other Registers
and Flash Memory or SRAM.
Figure 4.13: Generate Experiment - Fault Location
Step 5 - Fault Type
The fifth panel (Figure 4.14) is the definition of the fault type. The user must choose one
or more of the following types: Bit flip - which defines both the number of bits desired to flip
and the related mask; or Reset Value and Specific Value.
Figure 4.14: Generate Experiment - Fault Type
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Step 6 - Fault Trigger
The sixth panel (Figure 4.15) is the definition of the fault trigger. In this step the user must
choose one or more of the following triggers:
• Instruction Access Trigger - defines the assembly instruction that will trigger the fault
injection process. At this point, the EFD module can be used to help with the definition
of the trigger, interpreting the source-code conversion to assembly;
• Memory Access Trigger - defines a memory location that will trigger the fault injection
process, whether it be read or written in/from memory;
• Timeout Access Trigger - when the injection reaches a certain defined time, the fault
injection process starts.
Figure 4.15: Generate Experiment - Fault Trigger
47
Chapter 4. Automotive Plug-in Development
Step 7 - Access Before Trigger
In the seventh panel (Figure 4.16) the user specifies which values the plug-in will save in
the immediate time prior to the fault injection.
Figure 4.16: Generate Experiment - Access Before Trigger
Step 8 - Access After Trigger
In the eight panel (Figure 4.17), following the fault injection, the user specifies which values
the plug-in will save and after which steps of the processor.
Figure 4.17: Generate Experiment - Access After Trigger
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4.2.5 Run Fault Injection
The fault injection run process is completely hidden from the user. He can only access
information telling him at which state the fault injection process is and an Output Log.
Figure 4.18: Run Fault Injection
The fault injection run is one of the key aspects on this plug-in as it determines the efficiency
and the precision of the tool by defining and organizing all the activities and processes. Figure
4.19 shows the activity diagram representing a fault injection run.
Initially, the plug-in establishes the connection to the target system (microcontroller and
debugger), notifying the user if a connection failure occurs before the fault injection process
begins. The fault injection is composed by two main activities (detailed in Figure 4.20):
• Execute workload: deals with the execution of the binary running on the microcontroller;
• Execute injector: manages the injection of faults on the target system and the debugger
outcomes.
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Figure 4.19: Injection Run - Activity Diagram
Finally, it closes all connections to the target system and stores all the fault injection out-
comes from both the microcontroller and the debugger.
The fault injection process can have multiple solutions/resolutions, depending mainly on
the fault injection technique in use and later the developer's interpretation and programming
skills. This fault injection implements the SCIFI technique, which is the action of stopping
the microcontroller at the time of the injection depending on the defined trigger, changing the
necessary values and then resuming the process.
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Figure 4.20: Fault Injection Process - Activity Diagram
The fault injection process starts with the trigger installation on the target system. Once
the trigger has been installed it sends a message to the workload manager, whose execution
immediately starts. Then the injector waits for either two conditions:
1. workload reaches the specified trigger;
2. workload timeout reaches 0.
If 2) occurs, the fault injection process ends with no fault injected. On the other hand, if
1) occurs the microcontroller is stopped/halted so the fault can be injected. If the user wishes
to collect some location values before the fault injection, the plug-in does so and then injects
the fault on the microcontroller and collects the values of some locations, following the user's
command. The final step is to resume the microcontroller and wait for the workload to end if
it hadn't ended yet.
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4.3 Class Diagram
The CortexM3scifi plug-in is an extension of the csXception® product. In Figure 4.21 the
current class diagram of the Plug-in is represented, along with all the necessary connections
with the EME module.
Figure 4.21: CortexM3scifi class Diagram
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The initial csXception® package is "org/xception" and it contains all the modules that
compose the csXception® products (EME, EFD, Xtract, etc.). Each module has a package
and the following diagram only represents the packages and classes that interact with this
plug-in. Since the CortexM3scifi is an EME module it needs an abstract class that keeps all
the plug-ins in conformity. That class is the PlugIn class (inside org/xception/eme/modules).
Cortexm3scifiplugin is the package where all the classes of the Cortex-M3 Plug-in are lo-
cated. The Core class is the one that establishes the bridge with EME and extends the PlugIn ab-
stract class existent on the EME module. The Core class will handle all the information between
the csXception® and the Plug-in and whenever it receives a request to Copy/Paste/Delete an
Entity in EME, it redirects it to the EntityManager class, where all the Entity related information
is handled and returned so the necessary changes can be made in the Database to complete
these operations. The GuiinfobusHandler is the class responsible for handling the messages
exchanged through the GUI communication bus.
The Controller is instantiated by Core and it is a facade of all the fault injection actions.
The Controller communicates with three different packages:
• Fault Access Module (FAM) – this package contains all the classes responsible
for the access to the Cortex-M3 microcontroller. CortexM3FAM is the "core" class,
the one who establishes connection with the Controller class, managing all the other
classes existent in the same package. The CollectorManager manages the connection
to the target system during the fault injection run and instantiates the Collector class
that communicates with the target system collecting all the output data sent from the
Cortex-M3 microcontroller;
• Fault Definition Module (FDM) – is the package responsible for the fault defini-
tion phase and for generating new campaigns, experiments and injection runs. The
CortexM3FDM is the class that communicates with the Controller;
• Fault InjectionModule (FIM) – is responsible for injecting faults in the target system
but it manages the connection with the ICDI Board and the debugger as well. The
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CortexM3FIM is the class instantiated by the Controller. The InjectorManager manages
all the injection process and instantiates the Injector class that calls external debuggers
and communicates with the ICDI board, injecting all the necessary faults;
The GUI package contains all the SWING forms existent on the Cortex-M3 Plug-in and the
Utils package contains all the auxiliary classes used by other packages. The GridDataProducer
class manages the main grid of the plug-in, which is the grid where the campaigns, experiments
and injection runs are defined.
4.4 Database Design
Each plug-in has the possibility to create tables on the csXception® defined database, on
which they can store information related to themselves. csXception® will always verify the
conformance of the database at the beginning of the plug-in's loading and if the tables do not
exist, the program will automatically create them.
Database Schema
The plug-in database is loaded from an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) file that is in
compliance with a Document Type Definition (DTD) file (Figure 4.22). With this approach, the
database is defined in a simple and understandable XML file, being in coherence with all the
other plug-ins development.
Figure 4.22: Database Schema DTD
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The Cortex-M3 plug-in database contains four tables to save all the necessary data to inject
faults on the ARM® Cortex-M3 target system.
CortexM3scifiWorkload table
This table stores all the necessary information about each workload entity.
• executablepath – path of the executable file (usually .AXF) to run the workload;
• sourcecodepath – path of the workload source-code to launch the EFD with the workload
source file location.
Figure 4.23: XML code for CortexM3scifiWorkload table
CortexM3scifiFault table
This table is responsible for the storage of all the faults generated for each injection run,
saving all the necessary information according to the defined fault model (location, type, and
trigger).
• Fdmdescription – contains a text regarding all information on the row;
• Location – where the fault will be injected:
– Locationname – location description;
– Locationtype – location can have three different types: Processor Registers, Other
Registers and Flash Memory;
– Location – location code. If it is a Flash Memory it will be the hexadecimal ad-
dress.
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• Type – what is the fault injection operation:
– Faultype – type description;
– Fault – the calculated fault value;
• Trigger – what will trigger the fault injection process:
– Triggertype – a trigger can have three different types: Instruction, Memory and
Timeout;
– Triggerstartaddress – Trigger start address (used in Instruction and Memory trig-
ger);
– Triggerendaddress – Trigger and address (used in Instruction and Memory trigger);
– Triggertimeout – Timeout value in milliseconds (used in Timeout trigger);
– Triggercount – number of iterations on startaddress value before injecting the fault
(used in Instruction and Memory trigger).
Figure 4.24: XML code for CortexM3scifiFault table
CortexM3scifiFaultAccess table
This table's responsibility is to store all the registers/addresses that we want to evaluate
before and after the trigger advances for a given experiment.
• Evaluatebeforetrigger – is a string with all the addresses we want to evaluate before the
trigger goes forward. The addresses are separated by ":";
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• Evaluateaftertrigger – is a string with all the addresses we want to evaluate after the
trigger is activated. The addresses are separated by ":";
• Stepsnumber – the number of steps following the injection of the fault and prior to the
evaluation of the addresses defined on Evaluateaftertrigger.
Figure 4.25: XML code for CortexM3scifiFaultAccess table
CortexM3scifiResults table
This table's responsibility is to store all the necessary evaluating results for a given fault
injection run.
• Starttimestamp – the timestamp value in milliseconds when the fault injection run starts;
• Endtimestamp – the timestamp value in milliseconds when the fault injection run ends;
• Injected – this string is "TRUE" if fault was injected and is "FALSE" if it was not (ex:
when injection trigger is not reached);
• Statebeforetrigger – the list of evaluation values before injecting the fault;
• Stateaftertrigger – the list of evaluation values after injecting the fault;
• workloadoutput – text with all the outcome from the target system during workload run;
Figure 4.26: XML code for CortexM3scifiResults table
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Database Model
Figure 4.27 represents the final database model containing the csXception® base tables
(marked with the prefix “csXception::”) and also the Cortex-M3 Plug-in tables (marked with the
prefix “cortexm3scifi::”).
Figure 4.27: Database Model
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Case-study: Anti-lock Brake System
(ABS)
Summary
This chapter presents a case study related to the automotive industry with the purpose of
demonstrating the impact on the workload final results.
The chosen case study to prove the ARM® Cortex-M3 plug-in's impact in the automotive
industry was the Anti-lock Braking System.
5.1 Case-study Description
The ABS is an automotive safety system (Figure 5.1) that allows the vehicle's wheels to
maintain tractive contact with the road, preventing the wheel to lock itself up during braking
and helping the vehicle keep its stability and steering. The ABS system includes: wheel-speed
sensor, hydraulic modulator and an ECU. It is an automated system that uses the principles
of threshold braking and cadence braking, doing it with a better control than the one a driver
could manage (Burton, Delaney, Newstead, Logan, & Fildes, 2004).
The ABS appeared for the first time in 1929 and it was first developed for aircraft braking
systems. It was only in the 1960s that it made its first appearances in automotive industry.
59
Chapter 5. Case-study: Anti-lock Brake System (ABS)
Figure 5.1: Anti-lock Braking System
The ABS operates by detecting the onset of the wheel lock-up and then limiting the brake
pressure to prevent the lock-up. When the driver applies the brake, the slip increases until it
reaches the point of maximum friction between the tire and the road. At this point, the vehicle
will stop the braking process and will wait for the tire to reach a smaller friction point so the
process can restart until the vehicle stops completely.
5.2 Architecture and Design
The ABS system has several different components, such as a wheel-speed sensor, a brake
pressure modulator, a hydraulic electric pump, etc. The simulation of such a system requires
a huge knowledge on automotive braking systems and all its components. In an initiative to
avoid this effort, we found a simulator of an ABS system developed by Mathworks for the Mat-
lab Simulink product (MathWorks, n.d.).
This demonstrator simulates the dynamic behavior of a vehicle under hard braking con-
ditions. The wheel rotates with an initial wheel angular and vehicle speed of 70.4 rad/sec,
equivalent to 96.56 Km/h.
This ABS demonstrator calculates the “wheel slip” factor to verify at what instant the brake
will be activated. The desirable slip value is 0.2, which means that the number of wheel revolu-
tions equals 0.8 times the number of revolutions under non-braking conditions with the same
vehicle velocity. This maximizes the adhesion between the tire and the road and minimizes the
60
5.2. Architecture and Design
stopping distance with the available friction. Figure 5.2 represents the Simulink model of the
ABS system.
Figure 5.2: Matlab-Simulink ABS model
Now that we have an ABS simulator the question is: How can we run this demon-
strator on the Cortex-M3 microcontroller?
The Cortex-M3 microcontroller needs an executable/binary (e.g. .bin) file of the generated
source-code already compiled. Since Matlab has the capability to generate C/C++ code from
a Simulink model for the most varied target systems, we just need to generate the code and
then develop a build file to create a .bin executable.
At this point, the problem was to generate a C/C++ code to run on the ARM® Cortex-M3
microcontroller or any other embedded system, mainly because the model is using a variable-
step solver, which means that it will only be possible to generate code for real-time systems like
Windows or Linux. To solve this target system problem, we changed the ABS model to use a
fixed-step solver with small temporal intervals of 0.01 seconds and we obtained the same final
results as in the original model.
After generating the C/C++ source-code for the ARM® Cortex-M3 target system there are
still other things to be done, namely: Code re-factoring and Executable generation.
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Code re-factoring
In this phase we perform two main tasks:
• LED braking flash - Is the ability to control the flash frequency of a Light-Emitting
Diode (LED) present on the LM3S9B90 board in order to know when the vehicle is
braking or not. The LED is only on when the vehicle is breaking, otherwise it is set to
off.
• Output values - Works to analyze the data obtained during the fault injection looking
for variations. The demonstrator should return the values on each step (0.01 seconds),
such as:
1. Current time instance;
2. Vehicle's speed;
3. Vehicle's wheel speed;
4. Current braking distance.
Executable generation
The executable generation process was supported by the examples existent on the CD of
the Stellaris EKS-LM3S9B90 evaluation kit. Nonetheless, some custom adaptations are still
necessary in order to build all the demonstrator required dependencies and libraries.
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5.3 Fault Injection Results
In this section, the results obtained from the various binary executions on the board, with
and without fault injection on the ABS demonstrator, will be presented. The binary executions
presented next were preformed inside the Cortex-M3 microcontroller and obtained from csX-
ception® with the CortexM3cifi plug-in.
As referenced before, a target system can have the most varied kind of reactions when
exposed to abnormal situations. When we are working with critical systems, either in space or
automotive industry, this kind of situation has to be controlled at both software and hardware
levels.
5.3.1 Gold-Run
Gold-run is a demonstrator execution without injecting any fault. The final values are:
• Time to stop: 13.97 seconds;
• Distance to stop: 219.82 meters;
Figure 5.3: Gold-run - Velocity & Wheelspeed
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5.3.2 Fault Injection 1
When the execution begins, the fault injection process starts a counter and after 8 seconds
it changes the value of GPR 8 to 0x00000000 (Table 5.1).
Location Trigger Type
General Purpose Register 8 Timeout Reset Value
5 seconds 0x0000
Table 5.1: Fault Injection 1 - Details
The result is shown on Figure 5.4. The final values are:
• Time to stop: 16.7 seconds;
• Distance to stop: 265.7 meters;
Figure 5.4: Fault Injection 1 - Velocity & Wheelspeed
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5.3.3 Fault Injection 2
When the execution begins, the fault injection process starts a counter and after 10 sec-
onds it installs a trigger on the 0x00004D6A instruction (arithmetic instruction). When the
demonstrator reaches the instruction it changes the value of the GPR1 to 0x00000000 (Table
5.2).
Location Trigger Type
General Purpose Register 1 Timeout & Instruction Reset Value
10 seconds & 0x4D6A 0x0000
Table 5.2: Fault Injection 2 - Details
The result is shown in Figure 5.5. The final values are:
• Time to stop: 14.72 seconds;
• Distance to stop: 221.9 meters;
Figure 5.5: Fault Injection 2 - Velocity & Wheelspeed
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5.3.4 Fault Injection 3
When the execution begins, the fault injection process starts a counter and after 8 seconds
it changes the value of the memory address 0x20001698 (Table 5.3).
Location Trigger Type
0x20001698 Timeout Reset Value
8 seconds 0x0000
Table 5.3: Fault Injection 3 - Details
The result is shown in Figure 5.6. The final values are:
• Time to stop: 16.15 seconds;
• Distance to stop: 234.81 meters;
Figure 5.6: Fault Injection 3 - Velocity & Wheelspeed
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5.3.5 Result analyzis and comparison
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show some comparisons between vehicle speed, wheel speed
and distance between the gold run and the other three injected faults.
Figure 5.7: Results comparison - Vehicle speed
Figure 5.8: Results comparison - Wheel speed
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Figure 5.9: Results comparison - Distance
As shown in the previous figures, all the injected faults cause a reaction on the Cortex-M3
microcontroller, compromising the vehicle and, even more importantly, the physical integrity of
the driver.
Fault injection 1 has the most significant curve, even though it does not give any traceability
of the fault and, therefore, fails to let us know, for example, the current instruction or line in
the source-code.
In fault injection 2, the traceability is better because we already have knowledge on the time
instance and the source-code line. However, the fault was injected on the general processor
register 1, making it abstract, which means that at this moment we have no knowledge of what
value we are corrupting inside the GPR8.
Fault Injection 3 is a corruption on the value used to calculate the brake-pressure. Since the
value is a Double (8 bytes), in order to change it to 0.0 we need to change the following memory
addresses to 0x00000000: 0x20001698 (4 bytes) and 0x2000169C (4 bytes). Even though
this fault injection does not provide the most significant of results, it is the most traceable
and less abstract one since we are basically simulating the corruption of the break-pressure
component on the ABS system.
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Conclusion
Summary
This chapter presents a general discussion of the work that was presented in the previous
chapters specifying the goals defined for the developed project. It also shows the
difficulties experienced along this project and the proposed future work.
This project has demonstrated that using fault injection techniques in automotive-related
embedded applications is a potentially game-changing technique. The ABS case study that
was implemented shows that a small fault in the system can lead to huge differences in the
profile of internal system variables. The consequences of this behavior in such a system can
vary from mild to catastrophic.
6.1 Satisfaction on Goal Accomplishments
The main goals of this dissertation/project were to study, define and develop a fault in-
jection plug-in for a csXception® tool that should be capable of injecting faults on ARM®
Cortex-M3 microcontrollers. In order to achieve the proposed purposes the following steps
were followed:
• The study of fault injection was performed in order to understand the different techniques
and tools. Additionally, the detailed study of the ARM® Cortex-M3's architecture was
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very important so we could comprehend the main characteristics and limitations of the
board. At this stage, I appealed to CSW's engineers and papers in order to reach a good
working basis.
• The study of other plug-ins developed by CSW for csXception® tools, in particular the
study of the "Dynamic Plug-in" prototype that injects faults on the ARM® Cortex-M3
microcontroller. It has proven to be very useful for this project's development, although
the architecture is not in conformance and needs to be restructured.
• The study of the applicability of the plug-in to automotive industry. This particular study
concluded another study regarding the matter on which of the vehicle components
use Cortex-M3 microcontrollers and standards who recommended fault injection in the
vehicles' development.
• The requirements elicitation activity (Section 3.4) based on other plug-ins developed by
CSW and regarding architecture design, class diagram, database design and behavioral
diagrams definition.
• The writing of a research paper that was submitted and accepted to the 14th European
Workshop on Dependable Computing (EWDC2013) entitled "csXception®: First Steps
to Provide Fault Injection for the Development of Safe Systems in Automotive Industry".
The paper was co-written with Ricardo Barbosa and Nuno Silva and was presented by
me on the 16th May 2013.
• The development of the CortexM3scifi plug-in in conformance with the requirements
specified in Section 3.4.
• The development of a case study based on an ABS system running on the Cortex-M3
microcontroller, where faults are injected with the new plug-in, and later analyzing the
results (Chapter 5).
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6.2 Main Difficulties and Challenges
This dissertation ended with a felling of challenge accomplished, although various difficul-
ties were encountered along the way:
• Dissertation thematic on fault injection. Since FI was not a taught subject during my
academic education it was difficult at the beginning to assimilate some concepts, such
as differentiate the various FI techniques and distinguish and understand the role of the
various components of the FI system.
• Interaction and communication with external physical systems were a great challenge,
helping me grow technically in the area of computers' architecture.
• Public English presentation of my current project to a scientific audience was a rewarding
experience.
• The development of an ABS demonstrator based on a Matlab & Simulink model. Code
generation and Simulink design was a good and new experience, helping me to explore
other areas of software development.
6.3 Future Work
Despite having a functional fault injection plug-in that implements a significant amount of
features, there are still further steps to be considered:
• The improvement on the contemporary capabilities of the CortexM3scifi plug-in, making
it a more user friendly tool for automotive OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers);
• The completion of the domain's fault model and integration within the ARM® Cortex-
M3 prototype. Some information exchange with automotive OEMs would provide the
required knowledge (for example, hazard and risk analyzis field data) to achieve this
step, since it would be very important to build more correct and accurate fault models.
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